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REINFORCING REFUGEE PROTECTION IN 
THE WAKE OF THE WAR ON TERROR 
Edwin Odhiambo-Abuya* 
Abstract: This Article examines how the Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT) can be used as a practical tool to enhance the protection of per-
sons who have fled their home States in search of asylum in the wake of 
the global “war on terror.” It compares and contrasts provisions of CAT 
to similar provisions contained in international refugee law. This Article 
contends that, in some respects, the protection provisions of CAT are 
wider than those found in international refugee law, and, in other re-
spects, narrower than those found in international refugee law. It con-
cludes by suggesting strategies for meeting the challenges ahead. 
[I was] arrested by [Government] security forces [and] raped in [my] home in front 
of [my] children. . . . [I] was brutally beaten. . . . [I] was taken to Makal prison in 
Kinshasa. . . . [I] was not to receive any visits and shared a cell of 3 by 6 metres 
with seven other inmates. There were no proper sanitary provisions and [we] had to 
urinate on the floor. Every morning guards came into the cell and forced [us] to 
dance, [they] beat . . . and sometimes raped [us]. [I] was raped more than 10 
times. . . . I was regularly beaten, sometimes with whips made of tyres on which 
metal thread was stuck. [I] was burnt with cigarettes on the inside of [my] thighs 
and struck with batons. [I] was detained for one year without trial. [Eventually] 
with the assistance of one of the supervisors of the prison who had been bribed by 
[my] sister, [I] managed to escape [and fled overseas to seek asylum as a refugee]. 
—Pauline Kisoki 
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and refugee law at The University of Sydney, and obtained a Masters and undergraduate 
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Introduction 
 Many individuals such as Pauline Kisoki1 are increasingly forced to 
seek sanctuary in other States because of beatings and other brutal acts 
at the hands of the State, State-sponsored agents, or militia members, 
which often constitute torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment. According to Bent Sorenson, the former Vice-Chairperson of the 
Committee Against Torture (Torture Committee), a “considerable num-
bers of refugees have been subjected to torture.”2 Hard evidence col-
lected in Kenya,3 Macedonia,4 East Timor,5 and Afghanistan6 corrobo-
rates this position. This evidence substantiates the thesis that torture is 
one of the leading triggers that forces people to flee their home States 
in search of protection elsewhere as refugees. Yet the definition of “re-
fugee” in the 1951 United Nations (U.N.) Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees7 (Refugee Convention) is narrow because it excludes 
from protection those who have been forced to flee their home States 
because of the threat of torture. To qualify for asylum, the Refugee Con-
vention requires an applicant to prove that he or she has a well founded 
fear of persecution in his or her home State based on race, religion, na-
tionality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion. 
According to Article 1(A)(2) of the Convention, “refugee” means any 
person who: 
[O]wing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his na-
                                                                                                                      
1 Kisoki v. Sweden, Comm. No. 41/1996, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 16th Sess., 
¶¶ 2.2–.3, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/16/D/41/1996 (May 8, 1996). 
2 Bent Sorensen, Torture and Asylum, in An End to Torture: Strategies for Its 
Eradication 172, 174 (Bertil Dunér ed., 1998). 
3 In a recent survey that the author conducted on Kenya’s refugee status determina-
tion regime (2002–2003), more than half of the refugees and asylum seekers who partici-
pated in the project claimed they had suffered from acts that would constitute torture or 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. See generally Edwin Odhiambo-Abuya, United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees and Status Determination Imtaxaan in Kenya: An Empirical 
Survey, 48 J. Afr. L. 187 (2004) (for the results of the field study). 
4 Kosovo Refugees: Stories of Torture, Beatings, Extortion, Shortages, UNHCR.org, May 21, 
1999, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/print?tbl=NEWS&id=3ae6b81b6c. 
5 International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims (IRCT), Tulun Rai Timor, 
http://www.irct.org (follow “Find centres and programmes” hyperlink; then follow “Tulun 
Rai Timor” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 21, 2007). 
6 Relief to Traumatized Afghan Refugees in Pakistan, IRCT.org, Mar. 31, 2002, http://www. 
irct.org/Default.aspx?ID=159&M=News&PID=617&NewsID=11. 
7 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. 
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tionality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his for-
mer habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.8 
 The growing number of incidents of torture occurring globally, 
coupled with the lack of provisions in international refugee law to 
protect victims of torture, necessitates an appropriate legal response 
by this corpus of law. If appropriate measures are not taken, there is a 
high risk that asylum seekers fleeing torture will remain in limbo. Pro-
tection of these specific forced migrants is especially important now 
that we are living in a world of terror where fear of the “other” and 
threats of war and insecurity are more imminent than before.  In ad-
dition, it is likely that many host States will continue to deny entry and 
support to even the most genuine of cases.9 Since September 2001 
and the ensuing global fight against terrorism, substantial restrictions 
have been placed on those seeking asylum as refugees. Asylum seekers 
have been “redefined as agents of insecurity” and “even as a potential 
source of armed terror.”10 
 The purpose of this Article is not to address views on the use of 
torture.11 Rather, this Article evaluates the Convention Against Torture 
                                                                                                                      
8 Id. 
9 See Edwin Odhiambo-Abuya, Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: Examining Over-
lapping Institutional Mandates of the International Committee of the Red Cross and United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, 7 Sing. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 236, 246–49 (2003). See generally 
Mai Kaneko, Beyond “Seclusionist” Japan: Evaluating the Free Afghans/Refugee Law Reform Cam-
paign After September 11, 21 Refuge 34 (2003); Evelien Brouwer, Immigration, Asylum and 
Terrorism: A Changing Dynamic Legal and Practical Developments in the EU in Response to the 
Terrorist Attacks of 11.09, 4 Eur. J. Migration & L. 399 (2003); April McKenzie, A Nation of 
Immigrants or a Nation of Suspects? State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws Since 
9/11, 55 Ala. L. Rev. 1149 (2004) (for further evaluation of this theme). 
10 Gil Loescher, Refugees as Grounds For International Action, in Refugees and Forced 
Displacement: International Security, Human Vulnerability, and the State 31, 31, 
42 (Edward Newman & Joanne van Selm eds., 2003). 
11 Recently, some U.S. and Australian academics have worryingly advocated for the use of 
torture in cases involving suspected terrorists. See Mirko Bagaric & Julie Clarke, Not Enough 
Official Torture in the World? The Circumstances in Which Torture Is Morally Justifiable, 39 U.S.F. L. 
Rev. 581 (2005). See generally Alan Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding 
the Threat, Responding to the Challenge (2002) (defending the use of torture in “tick-
ing bomb” cases of terrorism). Not surprisingly, these views have drawn sharp criticisms from 
fellow academics. See generally, e.g., Anne O’Rourke et al., Torture, Slippery Slopes, Intellectual 
Apologists, and Ticking Bombs: An Australian Response to Bagaric and Clarke, 40 U.S.F. L. Rev. 85 
(2005); Ben Saul, Torturing Terrorists After September 11, 27 Int’l J. L. & Psychiatry 645 
(2004). 
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and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT)12 and the extent to which the treaty can reinforce the interna-
tional refugee protection regime in the wake of the so-called global 
“war on terrorism.” This Article contends that, notwithstanding in-
creased security concerns across the world, States are still duty-bound to 
respect their international human rights obligations. In order to meet 
the contemporary needs of persons displaced by torture, the term 
“refugee” needs to be interpreted in a manner that is likely to realize 
this objective. Put another way, this Article advocates a liberal rather 
than a narrow approach to defining the term “refugee.” International 
refugee law supports this liberal position. Recognizing the principle of 
universality of human rights, the preamble of the Refugee Convention 
provides that the overall objective of international refugee protection is 
to “assure” forced migrants “the widest possible exercise of . . . funda-
mental rights and freedoms” espoused by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR).13 This approach is consistent with the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention),14 which re-
quires States to interpret any treaty “in good faith” and “in the light of 
its object and purpose.”15 Additionally, States are required under the 
terms of the pacta sunt servanda16 rule to perform their obligations in 
“good faith.”17 
 Section I examines key provisions of CAT that seek to protect asy-
lum seekers. In Sections II and III, this Article compares and contrasts 
the protection regime of CAT to that of the Refugee Convention. These 
Sections further evaluate issues surrounding: (1) the scope of protec-
tion; (2) protected persons; (3) the non-refoulement concept; (4) relief 
under the international refugee and torture frameworks; (5) the eviden-
tiary threshold; (6) perpetrators of acts that cause flight; (7) the applica-
tion process; and (8) enforcement mechanisms provided for by these 
legal instruments. This Article contends that while certain protection 
                                                                                                                      
12 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 
(entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter CAT]. 
13 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A Res. 217A, art. 22, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
14 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
15 Id. art. 31. 
16 See Concise Australian Legal Dictionary 323 (2d ed. 1998) (pacta sunt servanda 
is a “fundamental principle of international law that treaties concluded properly are to be 
observed”). 
17 Vienna Convention, supra note 14, art. 26. 
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provisions of CAT are wider than those in refugee treaties, certain provi-
sions of CAT are narrower than those found in refugee treaties. The Ar-
ticle concludes by suggesting strategies for meeting the challenges ahead. 
I. Key Provisions of CAT 
 On December 10, 1984, at the thirty-sixth anniversary of the UDHR, 
the U.N. General Assembly unanimously adopted CAT.  CAT was de-
signed to globally combat incidents of torture.18 Earlier, on December 9, 
1975, the international community adopted a non-binding Declaration 
on the Protection of All Persons from being subjected to Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture 
Declaration).19 CAT is a multilateral treaty, guided by the Torture Decla-
ration, which came into operation almost two and a half years after its 
adoption on June 26, 1987. As of January 1, 2006, 141 States were party 
to CAT.20 While CAT recognizes the already existing prohibition against 
torture in international human rights law as proclaimed in the UDHR21 
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),22 
it was adopted to reinforce this prohibition. Consequently, the preamble 
to CAT states that the purpose of the treaty is to contribute to the “strug-
gle against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”23 
 With regard to its international supervisory mandate, the Torture 
Committee, the implementing body of CAT, discharges its function in 
four different ways. Article 19 requires State Parties to submit periodic 
reports to the Committee detailing the “measures they have taken to give 
effect to their undertakings under” the provisions of CAT. After studying 
a report of this kind, the Torture Committee makes its suggestions or 
comments and transmits them to the relevant State Party, which is at lib-
erty to respond.24 The Committee is also empowered to investigate, upon 
                                                                                                                      
18 The preamble to CAT underscores the treaty’s desirability “to make more effective 
the struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment throughout the world.” CAT, supra note 12, pmbl. 
19 G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3452 (XXX) (Dec. 9, 1975). 
20 See Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, http://www.ohchr.org/ 
english/countries/ratification/9.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2007) (for a list of parties). 
21 CAT, supra note 12, pmbl. 
22 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), U.N. 
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (en-
tered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
23 CAT, supra note 12, pmbl. 
24 Id. arts. 19(3), 19(4). 
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receipt of “reliable information,” incidents of torture in the territory of a 
State Party.25 Moreover, the Torture Committee may receive and con-
sider communications from one State Party regarding incidents of tor-
ture in another State Party.26 Lastly, the Torture Committee also has a 
mandate to receive and consider communications from individuals, such 
as asylum seekers, concerning claims of torture that occur in the terri-
tory of Member States.27 
 Ten experts constitute the Torture Committee.28 Ten members was 
considered sufficient because the subject matter to be dealt with by the 
Committee is more specific than the wide range of problems that other 
committees such as the Human Rights Committee have to handle.29 
The experts are elected by secret ballot from a list of persons submitted 
by Member States.30 Each member, however, is required to possess 
“high moral standing” and “recognized competence” in the area of 
human rights.31 Further, the experts, who are appointed for a term of 
four years,32 are required to serve in their “personal capacity.”33 This 
implies that they are expected to act independently or as members 
based on their own knowledge, experience, and judgment and that 
they shall not act on behalf of the government that nominated them, or 
on behalf of the country of their nationality.34 
A. The Definition of Torture and Establishing Torture 
1. Definition of Torture 
 In common parlance, “torture” refers to the “infliction of severe 
pain especially as a punishment or for the purpose of persuasion.”35 The 
legal definition of torture embodies a higher threshold. In the realm of 
law, for a person to claim that he or she has been a victim of torture, 
                                                                                                                      
25 Id. art. 20. 
26 Id. art. 21. 
27 Id. art. 22. 
28 CAT, supra note 12, art. 17(1). 
29 Herman Burgers & Hans Danelius, The United Nations Convention Against 
Torture: A Handbook on the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, In-
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 152 (1988). 
30 CAT, supra note 12, art. 17(2). 
31 Id. art. 17(1); see Election of Five Member of the Committee Against Torture, CAT/SP/26 
(Oct. 9, 2003) (for resumes of some of the members of the Torture Committee). 
32 CAT, supra note 12, art. 17(1). 
33 Id. art. 17(4). If re-nominated, an expert is eligible for re-election. Id. 
34 Burgers & Danelius, supra note 29, at 152. 
35 Oxford English Reference Dictionary 1521 (2d ed. 2000); The Chambers Dic-
tionary 1062 (9th ed. 2003). 
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evidence over and above that of being subjected to severe pain must be 
adduced. Although both the ICCPR and UDHR clearly prohibit torture, 
neither treaty attempts to define the meaning of the term. In contrast, 
Article 1 of CAT specifically and comprehensively defines the interna-
tional crime of torture: 
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such pur-
poses as obtaining from him or a third person information or 
a confession, punishing him or a third person for an act he or 
a third person has committed or is suspected of having com-
mitted, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, . . . 
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation 
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include 
pain or suffering arising from, inherent in or incidental to 
lawful sanctions.36 
This definition virtually mirrors the definition of torture contained in 
Article 1 of the 1975 Torture Declaration: 
1. [T]orture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at 
the instigation of a public official on a person for such pur-
poses as obtaining from him or a third person information 
or confession, punishing him for an act he has committed or 
is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him or 
other persons. It does not include pain or suffering arising 
only from, inherent to, lawful sanctions to the extent consis-
tent with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners. 
2. Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.37 
2. Establishing Torture 
 Four stringent elements are needed to establish torture under 
CAT. First, a person must demonstrate that the act at issue is more 
likely than not to cause severe mental or physical pain or suffering.38 
                                                                                                                      
36 CAT, supra note 12, art. 1. 
37 G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), supra note 19, art. 1. 
38 CAT, supra note 12, art. 1. 
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He or she must also demonstrate that the alleged act was committed 
intentionally.39 Third, the perpetrator of the act must be a public offi-
cial acting directly or through a duly appointed representative.40 Lastly, 
the act must be unlawful.41 
a. Severe Mental or Physical Suffering 
 A person must first establish that the alleged torturous act is more 
likely than not to cause severe mental or physical pain or suffering.42 As 
is the case with many international treaties, CAT makes broad provi-
sions, and, in particular, fails to provide examples of acts that would 
constitute torture.43 Nonetheless, emerging jurisprudence from the 
U.N. Torture Committee has attempted to fill this gap.44 In its first re-
port issued in 1986, the U.N. Special Rapporteur gave examples of acts 
that could constitute physical and mental torture.45  The report stated 
that beatings, burns (from cigarettes, electricity, burning coal), electric 
shocks, suspension, suffocation, exposure to excessive light or noise, 
sexual aggression, administration of drugs (causing vomiting, asphyxia, 
trembling, etc.), prolonged denial of sleep, food, sufficient hygiene, 
and/or medical assistance, threats to kill, and the disappearance of 
relatives all constituted physical or mental torture.46 This list is some-
what consistent with jurisprudence from the Torture Committee, which 
establishes that beatings,47 death threats,48 burning and destruction of 
property,49 sleep deprivation,50 rape,51 subjection to electric shocks,52 





43 See generally CAT, supra note 12. 
44 Id. art. 17 (establishing the Torture Committee and charging it with the responsibil-
ity for implementing CAT). 
45 Deborah Anker, Law of Asylum in the United States 487–88 (1999) (quoting 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Report of 
the Special Rapporteur, U.N. ESCOR, Comm’n Hum. Rts., 41st Sess., ¶ 119, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1986/15 (1986)). 
46 Id. 
47 S.G. v. Netherlands, Comm. No. 223/2002, U.N. Comm. Against Torture , 33d Sess., 
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/32/D/135/1999 (May 14, 2004); S.U.A. v. Sweden, Comm. No. 223/2002, 
U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 33d Sess., U.N. Doc. CAT/C/33/D/223/2002 (Nov. 29, 2004). 
48, L.J.R.C. v. Sweden, Comm. No. 218/2002, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 33d Sess., 
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/33/D/218/2002 (Sept. 20, 2005). 
49 Dzemajl et al. v. Yugoslavia, Comm. No. 161/2000, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 29th 
Sess., U.N. Doc. CAT/C/29/D/161/2000 (Dec. 2, 2002). 
50 Ltaief v. Tunisia, Comm. No. 189/2001, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 31st Sess., U.N. 
Doc. CAT/C/31/D/189/2001 (Nov. 20, 2003). 
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and submergence in ice53 could be construed as severe physical or 
mental torture. 
 The test of what would amount to severe pain or suffering ap-
pears to be subjective and each case is assessed on its own merits. As is 
the case in civil and criminal law, medical evidence and expertise is 
marshalled to prove the mental or physical aspects of each claim.54 
This form of evidence helps to guide a court or tribunal in their ef-
forts to reach a finding, especially in situations where an adjudicating 
body lacks the necessary knowledge or skill relating to particular as-
pects of the evidence.55 In the context of CAT, this principle was af-
firmed in G.R.B. v Sweden where the Torture Committee found that 
the medical evidence presented by the applicant supported her claim 
that she suffered “severely from post-traumatic stress disorder, most 
probably as the consequence of the abuse”56 she had earlier suffered 
at the hands of military forces in her home State. 
 In addition, a person must prove that the suffering they claim to 
have undergone was severe.57 Herman Burgers and Hans Danelius, 
two key participants in the drafting of CAT, state that “alternative 
wordings, such as extreme or extremely severe pain were suggested 
during the travaux préparatoires [drafting history], but the phrase ‘se-
vere pain’ was considered sufficient to convey the idea that only acts 
of a certain gravity shall be considered to constitute torture.”58 Few 
would deny that it is difficult to articulate with mathematical precision 
                                                                                                                      
51 G.R.B. v. Sweden, Comm. No. 83/1997, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 20th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. CAT/C/20/D/83/1997 (May 15, 1998); Kisoki, CAT/C/16/D/41/1996. 
52 R.S. v. Denmark, Comm. No. 225/2003, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 32d Sess., U.N. 
Doc. CAT/C/32/D/225/2003 (May 24, 2004); U.S. v. Finland, Comm. No. 197/2002, U.N. 
Comm. Against Torture, 30th Sess., U.N. Doc. CAT/C/30/D/197/2002 (May 22, 2003). 
53 Khan v. Canada, Comm. No. 15/1994, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 13th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. CAT/C/13/D/15/1994 (Nov. 18, 1994); Aemei v. Switzerland, Comm. No. 34/2002, 
U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 18th Sess., U.N. Doc. CAT/C/18/D/34/1995 (May 29, 1997). 
54 See S.K. Sarkar & Ejaz Ahmed, The Law of Evidence 868–936 (2003); Peter 
Murphy, Murphy on Evidence ch. 11 (2003). See generally Ian Freckelton & Hugh 
Selby, Expert Evidence: Law, Practice, Procedure and Advocacy (2005). 
55 See, e.g., sections 45 and 48 of the Indian and Kenyan Evidence Acts respectively. Sec-
tion 45 of the Indian Evidence Act defines expert as any person who is “specially skilled” in 
“foreign law, science or art or in questions as to identity of handwriting or finger impres-
sions.” Evidence Act, No. 1 (1872) (India). Section 48(1) of the Kenyan Evidence Act pro-
vides that an expert is a person who is “specially skilled” in “foreign law, science or art, or 
in questions as to identity or genuineness of handwriting or finger or other impressions.” 
Evidence Act, Laws of Kenya, CAP. 80 § 48(1) (1989). 
56 G.R.B., CAT/C/31/D/189/2001, ¶ 6.7. 
57 CAT, supra note 12, art. 1. 
58 Burgers & Danelius, supra note 29, at 117. 
286 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 30:277 
what amounts to severe pain or suffering. As a result, each case is 
evaluated on its own circumstances. However, it should be noted that 
torture can arise from a single act that may not, in and of itself, be 
classified as extremely severe. 
b. Objectives of the Perpetrator 
 The second requirement refers to the objectives of the perpetrator 
of an act.59 Article 1 of CAT requires a victim to prove that the act was 
intentionally designed to obtain “information or a confession,” or to 
intimidate, coerce, discriminate, or punish the victim (or a third per-
son) for an act committed or suspected to have been committed by the 
victim or a third person. Since the act in issue must be intentionally 
performed, it follows that accidents or negligent acts that cause pain 
and suffering do not qualify as torture. Because the phrase “for such 
purposes as” precedes the list of objectives, the list is illustrative and not 
exclusive. 60 It is notable that Article 1 of the Torture Declaration em-
ploys similar wording. Therefore, as new cases of alleged torture arise, 
other objectives may be included in that category. Even then, the words 
“such as” imply that unlisted purposes must have something in com-
mon with the purposes expressly listed. 
c. The Perpetrator 
 According to the drafting history of CAT, the definition of torture 
was the subject of lengthy debates and negotiations. A number of opin-
ions were expressed concerning the status of perpetrators of acts al-
leged to constitute torture. The French delegation argued that “the 
definition of the act of torture should be a definition of the intrinsic 
nature of the act or torture itself, irrespective of the status of the perpe-
trator.”61 This position failed to attract support. Most States, however, 
did agree that CAT should apply to “acts committed by public officials” 
and to acts for which those public officials “could otherwise be consid-
ered to have some responsibility.”62 The U.K. delegation suggested that 
the definition of perpetrator should be broadened to cover a “public 
official or any other agent of the State.”63 The delegation of the Federal 
                                                                                                                      
59 CAT, supra note 12, art. 1. 
60 Id. 
61 Burgers & Danelius, supra note 29, at 45. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
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Republic of Germany suggested a much boarder definition for public 
official: 
Not only to persons, who, regardless of their legal status, have 
been assigned public authority by state organs on a perma-
nent basis or in an individual case, but also to persons who, in 
certain regions or under particular conditions, actually hold 
or exercise authority over others and whose authority is com-
parable to government authority or-be it only temporarily-has 
replaced government authority or whose authority has been 
derived from such persons.64 
 Ultimately, it was agreed that the perpetrator of the act should be a 
public official acting directly or through a duly appointed delegate or 
agent. Accordingly, CAT applies not only to acts that are directly car-
ried out by governmental officials, but also to acts that such officials 
incidentally perform, as well as to acts of others that they tolerate or 
condone.65 This definition is broader than that of the Torture Declara-
tion, which limits torture to acts committed by or at the instigation of 
public officials.66 
 Article 16 of CAT requires State Parties to undertake measures that 
will prevent acts of torture “committed by or at the instigation of or 
with consent or acquiescence of a public official or any other person 
acting in an official capacity.”67 This provision imports a substantial 
amount of government control within the ambit of the act that is 
claimed to constitute torture. The requirement is consistent with the 
primary aim of the treaty, namely to reduce instances of torture 
“throughout the world” by States or their agents.68 The intention of the 
wording is to distinguish between official and private acts. As such, CAT 
excludes acts of abuse committed by opponents of the government, 
such as acts committed by militia, paramilitary, insurgents, guerrillas, 
and rebel groups. Thus in G.R.B. v. Sweden69 and S.V. v. Canada,70 the 
Torture Committee argued that allegations of torture at the hands of 
guerrilla groups, namely, Sendero Luminoso and Liberation Tigers of 
                                                                                                                      
64 Id. 
65 See generally CAT, supra note 12. 
66 G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), supra note 19, art. 1. 
67 CAT, supra note 12, art. 16. 
68 See id. pmbl. 
69 G.R.B., CAT/C/31/D/189/2001, ¶ 7. 
70 S.V. v. Canada, Comm. No. 49/1996, 30th Sess., ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/26/D/49/1996 
(May 15, 1996). 
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Tamil Elam (LTTE) respectively, fell outside the scope of the treaty. In 
both applications, the Torture Committee emphasized this difference: 
The issue whether the State party has an obligation to refrain 
from expelling a person who might risk pain or suffering in-
flicted by a non-governmental entity, without the consent or 
acquiescence of the Government, falls outside the scope of ar-
ticle 3 of [CAT].71 
Accordingly, it concluded in S.V.: “[T]he issue, on which the authors 
base part of their claim that they would suffer torture by LTTE or other 
non-governmental entities on return to Sri Lanka, cannot be consid-
ered by the Committee.”72 
 It would be unrealistic to require States to be accountable for acts 
solely committed by private actors. The rationale for this omission is 
based on the argument that these acts can be prosecuted via the na-
tional criminal justice system.73 It is unreasonable to assume, however, 
that acts committed by State-controlled or State-supported vigilante, 
death squads, or paramilitary groups will be prosecuted domestically. 
 In terms of proof, it is insufficient to show that a non-State actor 
committed an act. The test is whether the State abstained from or was 
unwilling to control those individuals or groups so that their actions 
can be “regarded as acts of the State rather than acts of private indi-
viduals.”74 Accordingly, a person must additionally establish that the 
State ignored the commission of the alleged act in question. The vic-
tim must demonstrate that a public official was aware of the commis-
sion of the torturous act and abstained from acting, thereby breach-
ing a legal obligation to intervene. The question of whether a 
government is unwilling to intervene is an evidentiary issue. As Hajrizi 
Dzemajl et al. v. Yugoslavia demonstrates, it is independent of the num-
ber of instances that a State is alleged to have failed to act. 75 
 The phrase “with the consent or acquiescence”76 does not appear 
in the Torture Declaration and was only added to the international 
                                                                                                                      
71 Id. ¶ 9.5; G.R.B., CAT/C/31/D/189/2001, ¶ 6.5. 
72 S.V., CAT/C/26/D/49/1996, ¶ 9.5. 
73 See Sadiq Elmi v. Australia, Comm. No. 120/1998, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 22d 
Sess., ¶ 5.2, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/22/D/120/1998 (May 25, 1999) (recognizing that a “[s]tate 
would normally be expected to take action, in accordance with its criminal law, against pri-
vate persons having committed acts of torture against other persons”). 
74 Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts, Oppenheim’s International Law 550 (9th 
ed. 1996). 
75 See generally Dzemajl, CAT/C/29/D/161/2000. 
76 CAT, supra note 12, art. 1. 
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human rights framework with the adoption of CAT. A person is gener-
ally said to acquiesce to an act when he or she willingly fails to take ac-
tion to prevent its commission.77 The Torture Committee examined 
this issue in Dzemajl.78 In April 1995, a report was lodged at the 
Danilovgrad Police Department alleging that two Romani minors had 
raped a Montenegrin girl, S.B.79 About 200 Montenegrins, led by the 
girl’s family, marched to the police station and called for the expulsion 
of all Roma from Danilovgrad.80 They threatened to exterminate and 
burn down Roma houses.81 Quite apart from attempting to quell the 
tension, the police responded by ordering the Romani residents to 
evacuate the settlement immediately as they were at risk of being 
lynched by the Montenegrins.82 Although most fled to a neighboring 
region, the applicants remained to safeguard their homes and live-
stock.83 Later the police informed them that “no one could guarantee 
their safety or provide them with protection.”84 Undisputed facts estab-
lished that the Montenegrins razed the entire Roma settlement later 
that night.85 They looted valuables and slaughtered cattle.86 Police offi-
cers present at the scene failed to stop the anarchy.87 Rather, they “sim-
ply moved their police car to a safe distance.”88 The applicants claimed 
that the officers did no more than feebly seek to persuade some of the 
attackers to calm down.89 The authorities did ensure, however, that the 
violence and destruction of property was limited to the Roma settle-
ment.90 
 Hajrizi and sixty-four other persons, all of Romani origin and na-
tionals of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, brought a claim alleging 
that the State was in breach of, among others, Articles 1 and 16 of CAT. 
Finding in their favor, the Torture Committee held that the burning 
and destruction of property constituted cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
                                                                                                                      
77 See Black’s Law Dictionary 25 (8th ed. 2004) (“acquiescence” means “implied 
consent to an act”). 
78 See generally Dzemajl, CAT/C/29/D/161/2000. 
79 Id. ¶ 2.1. 
80 Id. ¶ 2.2. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. ¶ 2.4. 
83 Dzemajl, CAT/C/29/D/161/2000,  ¶ 2.4. 
84 Id. ¶ 2.4. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. ¶ 2.7. 
87 Id. ¶ 2.12. 
88 Dzemajl, CAT/C/29/D/161/2000, ¶ 2.8. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. ¶ 2.9. 
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treatment or punishment.91 It also found that the police acquiesced to 
the unlawful acts as they failed to check the violent evictions and de-
struction of livelihoods: 
The complainants have sufficiently demonstrated that the po-
lice (public officials), although they had been informed of the 
immediate risk that the complainants were facing and had 
been present at the scene of the events, did not take any ap-
propriate steps in order to protect the complainants, thus im-
plying “acquiescence.”92 
 In their separate concurring opinion, Mr. Fernando Marino and 
Mr. Alejandro Poblete argued that the applicants had suffered torture 
because: 
(a) The[y] . . . were forced to abandon their homes in haste 
given the risk of severe personal and material harm; 
(b) Their settlement and homes were completely destroyed. 
Basic necessities were also destroyed; 
(c) Not only did the resulting forced displacement prevent 
them from returning to their original settlement, but many 
members of the group were forced to live poorly, without jobs 
or fixed places of abode; 
(d) Thus displaced and wronged, the[y] ha[d] still not re-
ceived any compensation, seven years after the fact, although 
they have approached the domestic authorities; 
(e) All the inhabitants who were violently displaced belong to 
the Romani ethnic group, which is known to be especially 
vulnerable in many parts of Europe. In view of this, States 
must afford them greater protection.93 
 Where State authority is wholly lacking, such as where the central 
government has collapsed, acts by groups exercising quasi-governmen-
tal powers have been found to satisfy the public official requirement 
and thus activate Article 3, the non refoulement obligation. As such, acts 
of groups exercising de facto prerogatives of the government fall within 
CAT. The Torture Committee addressed this principle in Sadiq Elmi v. 
Australia94 and H.M.H.I. v. Australia.95 In Elmi, the applicant, a Somali 
                                                                                                                      
91 Id. ¶ 9.2. 
92 Id. ¶ 9. 
93 Dzemajl, CAT/C/29/D/161/2000, Annex (to the primary decision). 
94 See generally Elmi, CAT/C/22/D/120/1998. 
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national, fled to Australia following the 1991 civil conflict in Somalia. A 
case officer from the Department of Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs, acting as a delegate for the Minister of Immigration and Multi-
cultural Affairs (Immigration Minister), rejected Elmi’s application for 
a protection visa and thus denied him refugee status.96 The Refugee 
Review Tribunal (RRT) affirmed this decision.97 A single judge of the 
Federal Court and a Full Court of the Federal Court dismissed subse-
quent appeals for review of the RRT’s decision.98 Subsequently, Elmi 
lodged an application for the grant of a protection visa based on “com-
passionate”99 grounds with the Immigration Minister.100 The Minister 
refused to grant him a protection visa,101 and Elmi became subject to 
deportation.102 Having exhausted the domestic legal framework, Elmi 
submitted an application to the Torture Committee arguing that his 
expulsion would constitute a violation by Australia of Article 3 of CAT. 
He further claimed that his background and clan membership would 
render him personally at risk of being subjected to torture. 
 At the time that Elmi lodged his application, Somalia lacked a cen-
tral government.103 In place were various armed clans that had control 
over different parts of the country.104 One of the central issues before 
the Torture Committee was whether Elmi would be subjected to torture 
at the hands of State officials upon his return, and would thereby satisfy 
the public official requirement. Australia argued that the application 
was inadmissible as the alleged torturous acts were committed by non-
State officials acting in their private capacity.105 In response, counsel for 
the applicant argued that in instances where a central government is 
absent “the likelihood that other entities will exercise quasi-govern-
mental powers”106 increases. At the time, certain armed clans were in 
effective control of territories within Somalia.107 Accordingly, counsel 
argued, the public official requirement in Article 1 was met. The Tor-
                                                                                                                      
95 H.M.H.I. v. Australia, Comm. No. 177/2001, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 28th 
Sess., ¶ 4.5, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/D/177/2001 (May 1, 2002). 
96 Elmi, CAT/C/22/D/120/1998,  ¶ 2.4. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. ¶ 2.5. 
99 Migration Act, 1958, §§ 417 & 501J (Austl.). 
100 Elmi, CAT/C/22/D/120/1998, ¶ 2.4. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. ¶ 2.5. 
103 Id. ¶ 4.20. 
104 Id. ¶ 4.20. 
105 Elmi, CAT/C/22/D/120/1998, ¶ 4.21. 
106 Id. ¶ 5.1. 
107 Id. ¶¶ 5.2, 5.5. 
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ture Committee agreed with the applicant’s view. In rejecting the Aus-
tralian contention, the Committee, which impliedly referred to the in-
ternational law definition of state,108 noted: 
For a number of years Somalia has been without a central 
government, that the international community negotiates 
with the warring factions and that some of the factions operat-
ing in Mogadishu have set up quasi-governmental institutions 
and are negotiating the establishment of a common admini-
stration. It follows then that, de facto, those factions exercise 
certain prerogatives that are comparable to those normally 
exercised by legitimate governments.109 
In sum, acts by groups exercising quasi-governmental power represent 
acts committed by public officials and could constitute torture. How-
ever, this theory only applies is in exceptional cases where a State has 
been without a functioning central government for a certain period 
of time, and the international community has dealt with the group or 
groups supposedly in power (for example, the warring clans in Soma-
lia), thereby giving these factions quasi-governmental status. 
 Some critics have cast doubt on the ability of the Torture Commit-
tee to realize its mandate. Matthew Lippman, for example, claims that 
the independence of the Torture Committee could be eroded signifi-
cantly since the ten experts are nominated, elected, and financed by 
State Parties.110 Therefore, he concludes, the Torture Committee is 
unlikely to take “bold or controversial initiatives.”111 This position is 
questionable. The jurisprudence that emerged from the Torture 
Committee challenges Lippman’s allegation. Contrary to Lippman’s 
assertion, the Torture Committee has made bold and controversial de-
cisions against State Parties, such as Australia in Elmi. Indeed, the Elmi 
decision is a significant development in CAT jurisprudence, because it 
shows the Committee’s willingness to adopt a flexible and broader pro-
tection-based approach in interpreting the Convention.112 
                                                                                                                      
108 See Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 
49 Stat. 3097 (entered into force Dec. 26, 1934) (underlining that one of the qualifications 
of a state is the “capacity to enter into relations with other states”). 
109 Elmi, CAT/C/22/D/120/1998, ¶ 6.5. 
110 Matthew Lippman, The Development and Drafting of the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 17 B.C. Int’l & Comp. 
L. Rev. 275, 320 (1994). 
111 Id. 
112 Brian Gorlick, The Convention and The Committee Against Torture: A Complimentary Pro-
tection Regime for Refugees, 11 Int’l J. Refugee L. 479, 490 (1999). 
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 It would be difficult, therefore, for a claimant to invoke this line of 
argument once a central government is re-established. Subsequent ap-
plications, such as H.M.H.I,113 Y.H.A. v. Australia,114 and United States v. 
Finland,115 addressed this point. In the 2001 decision of H.M.H.I, H, a 
Somalia national, sought to invoke Article 3 of CAT following the rejec-
tion of his application for refugee status. Australia argued that since 
October 2000 an internationally recognized Transitional National Gov-
ernment (TNG) had been established in Somalia.116 They argued that 
elections had been held at all levels117 and that the political circum-
stances in Somalia had changed since the Elmi decision in 1998. H re-
sponded by asserting that although a TNG was operational in Somalia, 
its authority was limited and confined to Mogadishu, the capital city.118 
He claimed that the rest of the country was still under control of the 
warring factions. The Torture Committee rejected his argument. It 
held that State authority had been re-established in Somalia in the form 
of the TNG, “which has relations with the international community in 
its capacity as National Government, though some doubts may exist as 
to the reach of its territorial authority and its permanence.”119 In the 
Committee’s opinion, this case fell outside the Elmi exception.120 
d. Lawful Sanctions 
 Lastly, the act that leads to severe pain and suffering should not 
arise from “lawful sanctions.”121 Notably, CAT does not define or seek to 
interpret the term “lawful.” Nonetheless, the term could be taken to 
mean those acts that are permitted by the law. As the Australian High 
Court noted in the 1909 decision of Bear v. Lynch,122 a lawful act is one 
that is not forbidden by law.123 Failure by CAT to define the phrase 
“lawful sanctions” leaves Article 1 open as to whether the sanctions 
must be lawful under international and/or domestic standards.124 Pnina 
                                                                                                                      
113 See generally H.M.H.I., CAT/C/28/D/177/2001. 
114 See Y.H.A. v. Australia, Comm. No. 162/2000, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 27th 
Sess., ¶ 4.5, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/27/D/162/2000 (Mar. 27, 2002). 
115 U.S. v. Finland, CAT, C/30/D/197/2002, ¶ 4.4. 
116 Y.H.A., CAT/C/27/D/162/2000, ¶ 4.5. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. ¶ 5.2. 
119 H.M.H.I., CAT/C/28/D/177/2001, ¶ 6.4. 
120 See infra Section 4. 
121 CAT, supra note 12, art. 1. 
122 (1909) 8 C.L.R. 592. 
123 Id. at 600, 603, 606. 
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Sharvit, a one-time Judge Advocate General of the Israel Defence 
Forces, claims that only domestic standards must be satisfied.125 This 
position is accurate to a certain extent. Both Article 2—requiring State 
Parties to make the necessary domestic arrangements to implement 
CAT—and Article 4—urging State Parties to ensure that “all acts of tor-
ture are offenses under its criminal law” —of CAT introduce national 
standards.126 
 Article 4, however, should not be interpreted to mean that State 
Parties are granted liberty to pass legislation to legitimize what could 
otherwise amount to torture in light of domestic and international 
standards.127 If this were the case, then the provision would have very 
little practical meaning and extremely limited application. While Arti-
cle 4 only refers to domestic law, Article 1 also embraces international 
legal standards.128 Support is found in the intention of the treaty, as 
expressed in its preamble, to ameliorate torture throughout the world 
and buttress the already existing international human rights law.129 Ar-
guably, the provision imports international human rights standards into 
the equation. In addition, Article 2(1) of CAT stipulates that Article 1 
of the treaty is “without prejudice to any international instrument or 
national legislation which does not contain provisions of wider inter-
pretation.”130 Moreover, the principal that human rights transcend na-
tional borders is today generally accepted.131 As such, sanctions must be 
consistent with both international and domestic legal standards. 
 Neither Article 1 nor any other article in CAT attempts to define 
what would amount to “cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.” 
The travaux préparatoires suggest that, owing to the vagueness of these 
terms, it was “impossible to find any satisfactory definition.”132 Conse-
quently, each case is assessed on its own merits. 
                                                                                                                      
125 Pnina Sharvit, The Definition of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, 23 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 147, 169 (1994). 
126 CAT, supra note 12, arts. 2, 4. 
127 See id., art. 4. 
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129 See id., pmbl. 
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B. Preventing Torture 
 CAT imposes two important obligations upon State Parties. The 
first obligation is contained in paragraph 1 of Article 2 and requires 
State Parties to make formal and non-formal arrangements at the do-
mestic level to prevent torture from occurring within the State and its 
territories.133 It makes it mandatory for State Parties to undertake judi-
cial and non-judicial measures that will eradicate torture. Notwithstand-
ing its broad wording, this provision is crucial, as it not only seeks to 
prevent torture from occurring within the physical boundaries of a 
State but also in other territories under its mandate. Other territories 
include a State Party’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zone, 
its excised migration zones, “ships flying its flag, and aircraft registered 
in the State concerned as well as platforms and other installations on its 
continental shelf.”134 In addition, paragraph 3 of Article 2 prohibits a 
perpetrator from invoking orders from a “superior officer” or “public 
authority” to justify acts of torture or other cruel or degrading treat-
ment or punishment.135 The paragraph was drafted against the back-
ground of the Nuremberg trials where junior officers raised the de-
fence of superior orders to justify acts that could amount to torture or 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment.136 This is an important 
element in making the prohibition of torture effective; it pre-empts ac-
cused torturers from successfully pleading that they were not acting on 
their own volition in an effort to defeat the “intentionally inflicted” re-
quirement of the torture definition. 
 Reinforcing paragraphs 1 and 3 is paragraph 2 of Article 2, which 
bars State Parties from derogating from the treaty.137  In other words, 
the Convention bars State Parties from taking measures that are con-
trary to their obligations under the treaty. Unlike many human rights 
protection treaties, this prohibition is not limited to times of peace.138 
                                                                                                                      
133 CAT, supra note 12, art. 2. 
134 Burgers & Danelius, supra note 29, at 124. 
135 CAT, supra note 12, art. 2. 
136 Walter Rockler, who served as a prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials from 1947 to 
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Rather, it is an absolute right to be free from torture, from which there 
is no derogation, even on grounds of national security or local politics: 
No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of 
war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other 
public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of tor-
ture.139 
In 1993, the Torture Committee reiterated the terms of paragraph 3 of 
Article 2 during an inquiry it conducted against Turkey pursuant to 
Article 20 of CAT, which empowers the committee to inquire into acts 
of torture that are alleged to be committed in a State Party’s terri-
tory.140 The Torture Committee pointed out that “no exceptional cir-
cumstances whatsoever . . . , may be invoked as a justification of tor-
ture.”141 
C. Refoulement 
 International law guarantees every person who has been forced to 
flee her or his home State the right to seek and enjoy asylum in a  an-
other State. Article 14 of the UDHR provides that “everyone has the 
right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecu-
tion.”142 Child (persons under the age of eighteen) asylum seekers are 
also guaranteed this entitlement under the terms of the 1990 Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child (CRC).143 Article 22 of the CRC re-
quires States to: 
                                                                                                                      
measures derogating from its obligations under the present Convention to the extent and 
for the period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that 
such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law and 
do not involve discrimination on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion, or so-
cial origin.”); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 15(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Aug. 3, 1953) (“In 
time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Con-
tracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to 
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures 
are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.”). 
139 CAT, supra note 12, art. 2. 
140 U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Summary Accounts of the Results of the Proceedings Con-
cerning the Inquiry on Turkey, 14 Hum. Rts. L.J. 426, 428 (1993) (reproducing the text of the 
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141 Id. at 428. 
142 UDHR, supra note 13, art. 14. 
143 Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 
(Nov. 20, 1989), 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC]. 
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[T]ake appropriate measures to ensure that a child who is 
seeking refugee status . . . , whether unaccompanied or ac-
companied by his or her parents or by any other person, re-
ceive appropriate protection and humanitarian assistance in 
the enjoyment of applicable rights set forth in the present 
Convention and in other international human rights or hu-
manitarian instruments . . . .144 
 Even so, there is no corresponding duty on State Parties to admit 
asylum seekers. States view such an obligation as an encroachment on 
their sovereignty. During the drafting of the Refugee Convention, the 
Canadian delegate was clear that, even if his country adopted the Refu-
gee Convention, “its federal structure meant that the provincial au-
thorities were sovereign in certain fields.”145 In recent times, asylum 
States, such as Australia, while invoking sovereignty, have claimed that 
they have a right to decide whom to admit into their territory and to 
determine the terms under which those who are admitted are allowed 
to stay.146 The reluctance to erode State sovereignty explains why States 
that adopted the Refugee Convention failed to embrace the 1967 Dec-
laration on Territorial Asylum,147 which sought to entrench the right to 
asylum in international refugee law.148 
 The Refugee Convention provides for the right of non refoulement. 
Under this obligation, States are prohibited from expelling, returning 
(refouler), or extraditing a person to any territory where it is more 
likely than not that he or she could face torture. Articles 32 and 33 of 
the Refugee Convention provide for this prohibition.149 Article 32 sets 
constraints on the ability of States to expel a refugee in their territory 
lawfully: 
(1) The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully 
in their territory save on grounds of national security or pub-
lic order. 
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(2) The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursu-
ance of a decision reached in accordance with due process of 
law. Except where compelling reasons of national security 
otherwise require, the refugee shall be allowed to submit evi-
dence to clear himself, and to appeal to and be represented 
for the purpose before competent authority or a person or 
persons specially designated by the competent authority.150 
Article 33 provides for the norm of non refoulement. It prohibits States 
from: 
[E]xpel[ling] or return[ing] (“refouler”) a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life 
or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, relig-
ion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion.151 
These provisions are consistent with a proposal made by the Swedish 
delegate at the Conference of Plenipotentiaries.152 
 Article 3 of CAT codifies the norm of non-refoulement.153 This Article 
has no equivalent in the Torture Convention, and thus creates a signifi-
cant addition to the international human rights protection framework. 
The wording of Article 3 draws explicitly on the language of Article 33 
of the Refugee Convention, which prohibits State Parties from refouling 
asylum seekers to States where their lives would be threatened.154 
 To reiterate, the appropriate test is whether it is more likely than 
not that a person will suffer torture if returned to a particular State. 
The crucial question is not whether there are substantial grounds “for 
believing that the applicant would be tortured if returned, but rather 
whether there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she 
                                                                                                                      
150 Id. art. 32. 
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2007] Refugee Protection and the War on Terror 299 
would be in danger of being tortured.”155 This position is consistent with 
the emerging jurisprudence from the Torture Committee.156 At its 
317th meeting, the Torture Committee issued its first General Com-
ment to guide State Parties and individuals regarding the implementa-
tion of Article 3 within the context of the procedure envisaged in Arti-
cle 22.157 The General Comment interpreted the reference to “another 
State” in CAT’s Article 3 broadly. According to the General Comment, 
the phrase “another State” refers to “the State to which the individual 
concerned is being [transferred], as well as any State to which [he or 
she] may subsequently be expelled, returned or extradited.”158 
 Article 3 requires that a decision on whether substantial grounds 
have been established be guided by, among others, an assessment of 
the general human rights situation of the country of return.159 Factors 
to be taken into consideration include the existence in the State con-
cerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant, or mass violations of 
human rights.160 This does not mean that a person is automatically 
immune from being transferred to a State with a poor human rights 
history. Nor does it mean that he or she is obviously returnable to a 
State with a good human rights record. As the Torture Committee has 
consistently maintained, one must adduce “additional grounds” to 
demonstrate that he or she “would be personally at risk.”161 Each case 
must be examined on its own merits, with the human rights pattern of 
a State remaining a weighty factor. Relevant considerations, according 
to the General Comment, include: 
• Has the person been tortured or maltreated by or at the instiga-
tion of or with the consent of acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity in the past? If so, was this 
in the recent past? 
                                                                                                                      
155 David Weissbrodt & Isabel Hörtreiter, The Principle of Non-Refoulement: Article 3 of the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 
Comparison with the Non-Refoulement Provisions of other International Human Rights Treaties, 5 
Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1999). 
156 See, e.g., Mutombo v. Switz., Comm. No. 13/1993, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 
12th Sess., ¶ 9.3, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/12/D/13/1993, (Apr. 27, 1994). 
157 U.N. Comm. Against Torture, General Comment 1, Implementation of Article 3 of the 
Convention in the Context of Article 22: 21/11/97, Annex IX, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/53/44 [here-
inafter CAT General Comment]. 
158 Id. ¶ 2. 
159 See CAT, supra note 12, art. 3. 
160 Id. art. 3(2). 
161 Y.H.A, CAT/C/27/D/162/2000, ¶ 7.2; Khan, CAT/C/32/D/15/1994, ¶ 12.2; Mu-
tombo, CAT/C/12/D/13/1993, ¶ 9.3. 
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• Is there medical or other independent evidence to support a claim 
by the author that he/she has been tortured or maltreated in the 
past? Has the torture had after-effects? 
• Has the internal situation in respect of human rights altered? 
• Has the author engaged in political or other activity within or out-
side the State concerned which would appear to make him/her 
particularly vulnerable to the risk of being placed in danger of tor-
ture were he/she to be expelled, returned or extradited to the 
State in question? 
• Is there any evidence as to the credibility of the author? 
• Are there any factual inconsistencies in the claim of the author? If 
so, are they relevant? 162 
Sources of information would include U.N. agencies, governments, 
non-governmental organizations, international and local human rights 
groups, domestic and international newspapers, and writings of ob-
servers.163 
 Although the risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go 
beyond mere theory or suspicion, the Torture Committee maintains 
that an individual, upon whom the burden rests,164 does not have to 
show that the risk is highly probable.165 If this was the case, it would be 
“contrary to the spirit” of CAT.166 In fact, in certain respects, the Com-
mittee has been known to grant considerable latitude to applicants. For 
example, in the landmark decision of Pauline Kisoki v. Sweden, notwith-
standing the contradictions and inconsistencies in the petitioner’s tes-
timony, the Torture Committee still prohibited the State Party from 
returning the applicant to Zaire.167 The Committee argued that “com-
plete accuracy is seldom to be expected by victims of torture and that 
such inconsistencies as may exist in the author’s presentation of the 
facts are not material and do not raise doubts about the general verac-
                                                                                                                      
162 CAT General Comment, supra note 157, ¶ 8. 
163 In A.K. v. Australia, for instance, the applicant relied on reports produced by Am-
nesty International (¶¶ 2.10 and 2.11), the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (¶ 4.13), 
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165 CAT General Comment, supra note 157, ¶ 6. 
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167 Kisoki, CAT/C/16/D41/1996, ¶ 10. 
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ity of the author’s claims.”168 The danger of being subjected to torture, 
however, must be “foreseeable . . . real and personal.”169 
II. Strengths: CAT and the Refugee Convention Compared 
 By way of comparison to international refugee law, CAT offers at 
least five significant advantages to refugees and asylum seekers with re-
gard to the scope of protection, protected persons, the refoulement pro-
hibition, the nexus requirement, and time considerations. 
A. Scope 
 The first notable feature of CAT concerns its scope of protection. 
Many States have adopted and use the classic definition of refugee 
found in the Refugee Convention to assess claims lodged by those seek-
ing asylum as refugees.170 Under the Convention, the term “refugee” 
means any person who has fled her or his home State owing to a well-
founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group, or political opinion.171 This defini-
tion does not explicitly include asylum seekers—persons seeking pro-
tection as refugees.172 However, unlike the refugee treaties, CAT is 
more general and targets a person who, for whatever reason, is in dan-
ger of being subjected to torture if handed over to another State.173 Its 
scope thus extends to cases that involve asylum seekers. It is apparent, 
therefore, that the scope of CAT is more far-reaching than the Refugee 
Convention. 
B. Excluded Persons 
 A second advantage CAT has over the Refugee Convention relates 
to categories of persons that are excluded from protection by the Con-
vention. International refugee law excludes specific categories of per-
                                                                                                                      
168 Id. ¶ 9.3. 
169 M.P.S. v. Australia, Comm. No. 138/1999, U.N. Comm. Against Torture, 28th Sess., 
¶ 7.5, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/28/D/138/1999 (Apr. 30, 2002); Aemei, CAT/C/18/D/34/1995, 
¶ 9.5; S.V., CAT/C/26/D/49/1996, ¶ 9.8. 
170 Refugee Act, 1996 §§ 2, 42 (Ir.), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/1976_33. 
html; Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(A)(42)(a) (2004);  Refugees Act, Laws 
of Kenya, § 3(1) (2006). 
171 Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 1(A)(2). 
172 See Edwin Odhiambo-Abuya, Revisiting Liberalism and Post-Colonial Theory in the Con-
text of Refugee Applications, 24 Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 193, 214–18 (2006) (for further analysis 
of the distinction between “refugee” and asylum seeker). 
173 See id. 
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sons, regardless of whether they meet the criteria of refugee set forth in 
Article 1(A) of the Refugee Convention, so long as there are “serious 
reasons” for considering that they have engaged in criminal acts, in 
their State of origin or elsewhere, before entering a host State.174 Be-
fore a claim is rejected because the applicant is alleged to have commit-
ted an offence, the claim is first considered in its entirety to determine 
whether the application has any merits. The rule is to exclude after this 
determination, not before.175 A person against whom there is sufficient 
evidence to show that he or she has committed any of the following of-
fenses is excluded from international protection: 
• A crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as 
defined in international law; 
• A serious non-political crime in their home or any transit State; 
• Acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Na-
tions. 176 
Domestic legislation of many refugee-host States also recognizes these 
grounds of exclusion.177 
 The Exclusion Clause has a dual purpose. Primarily, the Clause is 
intended to prevent fugitives who may have committed criminal of-
fenses in their State of origin or in any other State from hiding as 
refugees and, thereby, defeating the course of justice. The travaux pré-
paratoires to the Refugee Convention supports this view. In his speech 
to the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
Stateless Persons, Sergije Makiedo, the Yugoslav representative, argued 
that the draft Refugee Convention was too narrow, and thus unac-
ceptable, because the definition of the term “refugee”: 
[E]xclude[d] persons who had committed crimes as defined 
in Article 14 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
or in Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tri-
                                                                                                                      
174 See Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 1(A). 
175 U.N. High Comm. for Refugees (UNHCR), Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for 
Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, ¶¶ 28–31, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/Rev.1 ( Jan. 1992) [hereinafter UNHCR 
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176 Refugee Convention, supra note 7, art. 1(F); see also UDHR, supra note 13, art. 
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arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of 
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177 See, e.g., Immigration Act 1987, 1987 S.N.Z. No. 74, § 129L; The Government of the 
United Republic of Tanzania, Bill Supplement, “The Refugees Act, 1998,” No. 6, Gazette of 
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bunal. [Accordingly], notorious war criminals would continue 
to find protection in the territory of States Members of the 
United Nations.178 
A handbook published by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) to guide officials during the refugee status determination 
proceedings explains that the Exclusion Clause was written into the 
Refugee Convention to prevent post-World War II criminals from gain-
ing protection due to a host State’s lack of territorial jurisdiction to 
prosecute.179 In addition, the clause bars States from according refugee 
status and accompanying entitlements to certain persons, especially 
suspected criminals who might otherwise constitute a threat to national 
security. 
 In contrast, considering that it is silent towards the exclusion of 
persons generally, CAT differs significantly. As long as a person is able 
to satisfy the criteria of torture contained in Article 1, they can invoke 
the non refoulement protection. A survey of decisions handed down by 
the Torture Committee affirms this position.180 This jurisprudence dem-
onstrates that many claimants who seek protection under CAT have 
been involved in political activities in their home State.181 In fact, it is 
because of their political involvement that many seek sanctuary else-
where, mostly in the West. In the context of refugee law, these claim-
ants would fall within the “persecution for” category of the term 
“refugee” of the Refugee Convention.182 
 Under CAT, this class of persons must establish that they are more 
likely than not to be subjected to danger if moved to the State where an 
offense is claimed to have been committed. In Said Aemei v. Switzer-
land,183 S.H. v. Norway,184 and Gorki Paez v. Sweden,185 the applicants ad-
mitted that they had been involved in political and criminal activities in 
their home States. S, for instance, a member of the Ethiopian All-
Amhara People’s Organization, was in charge of propaganda and re-
                                                                                                                      
178 Summary Record of the Third Meeting, supra note 145, at 7. 
179 UNHCR Handbook, supra note 175, ¶ 147. 
180 See generally, e.g., Mutombo, CAT/C/12/D/13/1993; U.S. v. Finland, CAT/C/30/D/ 
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184 See generally S.H., CAT/C/23/D/121/1998. 
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cruitment, smuggling weapons, and organizing attacks to capture 
weapons and making arrangements for their distribution.186 Aimei, an 
activist for the Iranian People’s Mojahedin, confessed to throwing a 
Molotov cocktail into the house of a senior Iranian official.187 
 In Paez, the Swiss Board of Immigration rejected the claimant’s 
application for asylum because he had participated in serious non-
political crimes in Peru, contrary to article 1F of the Refugee Conven-
tion and Chapter 3(2) of the 1990 Aliens Act.188 This decision, which 
the Appeals Board affirmed, was based on Paez’s admission that he 
distributed leaflets and handmade bombs that were used against the 
police during a demonstration in Peru.189 In finding for the applicant, 
the Torture Committee underlined the absolute nature of CAT: 
The Committee considers that the test of article 3 of  [CAT] 
is absolute. Whenever substantial grounds exist for believing 
that an individual would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture upon expulsion to another State, the State party is 
under obligation not to return the person concerned to that 
State. The nature of the activities in which the person con-
cerned engaged cannot be a material consideration when 
making a determination under article 3 . . . .190 
 Does this mean that “bad” refugees—those likely to be excluded 
from refugee protection on grounds of national security—can cir-
cumvent the criminal justice system by hiding under CAT? Consider-
ing that the primary goal of CAT is to combat torture, all potential 
victims are protected for as long as they are in danger of being sub-
jected to torture, irrespective of a person’s past conduct. As noted by 
the Swiss delegate at the drafting process, the “aim of the [Conven-
tion] was not to create new categories of victims.”191 Even so, once it is 
established that a person is no longer at risk, he or she can be trans-
ferred to any State where it is alleged that an offense was committed 
for prosecution. 
 It must also be emphasised that a finding in favor of a failed asylum 
applicant under Article 3 of CAT in no way guarantees a person refugee 
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status or affects an asylum application. The question of whether or not a 
person should be granted asylum rests on a refugee-receiving State. 
C. Refoulement 
 The third advantage relates to the norm of refoulement, which all 
treaties prohibit. In the context of refugee law, Article 33 of the Refu-
gee Convention prohibits State Parties from expelling or returning 
refugees to States where they are likely to face the risks they originally 
fled.192 Although the Refugee Convention further prohibits States from 
making reservations on, among others, Article 33,193 the general pro-
tection offered to refugees is nonetheless limited considering that 
States can derogate from this provision on grounds of national security. 
Article 32 of the Refugee Convention, which prohibits States from re-
fouling refugees save for reasons of “national security or public order,” 
reinforces this provision.194 
 In contrast, CAT prohibits States from derogating from Article 3 
if a person satisfies the criteria set forth in Article 1.195 Article 3 of the 
1975 Torture Convention first established this rule: 
Exceptional circumstances such as a state of war or a threat of 
war, internal political instability or any other public emer-
gency may not be invoked as a justification of torture or other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 196 
This prohibition is currently found in Article 2 of CAT, which provides: 
No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or 
a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public 
emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.197 
Unlike refugee law, the non-refoulement provision in CAT is absolute and 
non-derogable, even for reasons of public emergency, and irrespective 
of a claimant’s criminal record. Therefore, under no exceptional cir-
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cumstances whatsoever is a State justified in returning a potential victim 
of torture to any State. The Torture Committee has consistently em-
phasised this position. In Aemei, for instance, it was underlined that: 
[T]he protection accorded by article 3 of the Convention is 
absolute. Whenever there are substantial grounds for believ-
ing that a particular person would be in danger of being sub-
jected to torture if he was expelled to another State, the State 
party is required not to return that person to that State. The 
nature of the activities in which the person engaged is not a 
relevant consideration in the taking of a decision in accor-
dance with article 3 of the [CAT].198 
Similarly, in Paez the Torture Committee contended: 
[T]he test of article 3 of the Convention is absolute. When-
ever substantial grounds exist for believing that an individual 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon expul-
sion to another State, the State party is under obligation not 
to return the person concerned to that State. The nature of 
the activities in which the person concerned engaged cannot 
be a material consideration when making a determination 
under article 3 of the [CAT].199 
 Because Article 2 of CAT covers any State, not merely an appli-
cant’s home State, State Parties to the treaty, or transit States, this gives 
CAT “potentially wide territorial scope.”200 The legislative history of 
CAT suggests that the provision was written into the treaty in order to 
make the refoulement provision “more complete.”201 Worthy of note is 
that the grounds enumerated in Article 3 are examples of circum-
stances that might otherwise give rise to “public emergency.”202 Thus, 
other circumstances may be brought under this heading as long as an 
applicant can demonstrate that they fall within the general category of 
public emergency. The Torture Committee made this point in Balabou 
Mutombo v. Switzerland203 and Khan v. Canada,204 where it sought to pro-
hibit Switzerland and Canada from returning failed asylum claimants 
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who had nonetheless demonstrated that they could suffer torture if re-
patriated. 
 In Mutombo, the applicant, a Zaire (now Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC)) national, alleged that he had suffered torture at the 
hands of Government officials because of his membership in a pro-
democracy political party, Union pour la Démocratie et le Progres So-
cial (UDPS).205 The applicant claimed that the UDPS had challenged 
the despotic rule of the late President Mobutu Sese Seko.206 The appli-
cant alleged that he was subjected to electric shocks, beaten with a rifle, 
and that his testicles were bruised until he lost consciousness.207 He 
then fled to Switzerland and applied for asylum.208 His primary applica-
tion to the Cantonal Office for Asylum Seekers was rejected on grounds 
of credibility. Subsequent appeals to the Federal Refugee Office and 
Commission of Appeal in Refugee Matters also failed, and he became 
at risk of deportation.209 
 The applicant’s main assertion before the Torture Committee was 
that there was a real risk that he would suffer torture if returned to the 
DRC.210 Responding to this allegation, Switzerland argued that the ap-
plicant had failed to satisfy the “substantial grounds for” test in Article 
3(1) of the Swiss Aliens Act.211 Considering the generalized violations 
of human rights that had been reported in Zaire, Switzerland argued 
that to come under Article 3 the applicant had to show that he be-
longed to a particular group, that was confined to a particular territory, 
at whom the violations were directed.212 In short, the applicant had to 
show that a real risk existed that he could be subjected to torture. The 
Torture Committee found that there were substantial grounds for be-
lieving that the applicant would be in danger of being subjected to tor-
ture if returned to the DRC.213 It drew on his political record and the 
serious human rights situation in Zaire, which various U.N. agencies 
had documented. These agencies included the Commission on Human 
Rights and special reports prepared by, among others, the Special Rap-
porteur on the Question of Torture.214 In conclusion, the Committee 
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noted “that a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant, or mass violations 
does exist in Zaire and that the situation may be deteriorating.”215 Ac-
cordingly, the Torture Committee held that returning the applicant to 
the DRC would constitute a violation of CAT Article 3. It also declared 
that Switzerland had an “obligation to refrain from expelling [the ap-
plicant] to Zaire, or any other country, where he runs a risk of being 
expelled or returned to Zaire or of being subjected to torture.”216 An 
asylum seeker can only be returned when he or she is no longer in 
danger of being subjected to torture. In this respect, the scope of Arti-
cle 33 of the Refugee Convention is much narrower than Article 3 of 
CAT.217 
D. Nexus Requirement 
 For an individual to be granted refugee status under the Refugee 
Convention, the alleged victim must demonstrate that he or she  suf-
fered persecution for “reasons of” any one of the five grounds enumer-
ated in the treaty.218 In YHA v. Australia,219 for example, the petitioner’s 
asylum claim was rejected because he was unable to prove a nexus be-
tween the danger that he faced and his clan membership.220 Relief un-
der CAT is not limited by a nexus requirement. A person only needs to 
establish the substantial likelihood of enduring severe mental pain or 
suffering inflicted by a public official if returned to another State. Cases 
like Paez,221 Aemei,222 and Mutombo223 support this proposition. This is a 
significant development because failure to connect persecution with 
any one of the five specified reasons has led, and continues to lead, to 
the rejection of otherwise meritorious asylum applications in various 
parts of the world.224 
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E. Assessment of Applications: Time Concerns 
 Refugee status applications and applications for relief under CAT 
are first heard and determined by a status assessment official or the 
Torture Committee, respectively.225 Generally, the adjudicating bodies 
apply the requisite legal tests to the evidence to determine whether a 
person meets the set criteria. Successful applicants are granted protec-
tion under both regimes.226 A major difference, however, exists with 
regard to failed claimants. Those asylum seekers whose claims are re-
jected under the refugee framework can challenge these decisions 
through an appeals process,227 which is available in most refugee-host 
States.228 In contrast, those whose claims are rejected by the Torture 
Committee have no further recourse.229 This Section focuses on the 
time spent to finalize asylum and torture applications. Figures 1 and 2 
(below) are graphical representations of the procedures used to assess 
refugee and torture applications. 
 Applications lodged under the refugee framework involve more 
procedural steps than those filed under CAT.230 Consequently, it may 
take longer to obtain relief via the refugee route, especially in instances 
where a claim is rejected and an asylum seeker lodges an appeal. In 
many instances, the multi-layered asylum process has lengthened the 
road to relief for refugee applicants, as compared with that of those 
who seek protection under CAT. Table 1 below231 compares and con-
trasts the (approximate) time it took to assess refugee and torture ap-
plications for a period of just over ten years, from 1993 to 2004. The 
data is drawn from claims lodged by failed asylum seekers who subse-
quently sought relief from the Torture Committee. For consistency 
purposes, the same claims are used and fourteen applications are ana-
lyzed. 
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 Table 1: Time Required to Assess Applications  
 Refugee Claims Torture Applications 
 0–1 years 1 (Elmi) 3 (GRB, Elmi, SA) 
 1–2 years 5 (SG, YHA, Villamar, RT, SA) 6 (Paez, HMHI, US, YHA, SH, RS) 
 2–3 years 4 (GRB, SH, HMHI, US) 2 (RT, BSS) 
 3–4 years 1 (RS) 1 (Villamar) 
 4–5 years  2 (SV, Paez) 2 (SV, SG) 
 Above 5 years 1 (BSS) 0 
 
 What does the data suggest? Of the fourteen applications that 
came before the Torture Committee between 1993 and 2004, just un-
der one-fifth (three applications, or twenty-one percent) were decided 
within one year. A much lower output of seven percent (one applica-
tion) was recorded for refugee claims. According to the survey, the vast 
majority of asylum applications (twelve applications, or eighty-six per-
cent) were handed down in between one and five years. Again, the Tor-
ture Committee posts a favorable outcome, as just over two-thirds 
(eleven applications, or seventy-eight percent) of the surveyed claims 
were assessed within these time lines. Lastly, whereas at least one asylum 
claim took over five years to finalize, none of the applications lodged in 
the Torture Committee fell into this category. This evidence suggests 
that the probability of receiving a decision, positive or negative, within 
one year under the CAT framework is almost three times higher than 
under the refugee regime. Additionally, the chances that a claim will be 
heard and determined within five years are lower under the refugee 
assessment framework. Moreover, it is highly unlikely for an application 
lodged with the Torture Committee to take more than five years to fi-
nalize. In sum, the data supports the argument that applications under 
the CAT regime are generally expedited, notwithstanding the fact that 
the Torture Committee meets only twice every year.232 
                                                                                                                      
232 See U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Committee Against Torture: Monitoring the 
Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2007) 
(“The [Torture] Committee meets in Geneva and normally holds two sessions per year 
consisting of a plenary (of three weeks in May and two weeks in November) and a one-
week pre-sessional working group.”). 
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III. Limitations: Torture Convention and International 
Refugee Law 
 Within the CAT communication system, at least four shortcomings 
can be identified. These relate to the evidentiary threshold, the perpe-
trator of the act causing flight, the claim application process, and en-
forcement mechanisms. 
A. Evidentiary Threshold 
 The evidentiary threshold or standard of proof that a petitioner 
should satisfy presents the first shortcoming associated with proceeding 
under CAT. To succeed under this treaty “substantial grounds” must be 
established.233 The original Swedish draft of the Torture Convention234 
proposed that there should be reasonable grounds to believe that a per-
son might be in danger of suffering torture and other cruel, inhuman, 
degrading inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.235 Under 
the terms of the present wording, there must be a “factual basis for [a 
person’s] position sufficient to require a response from the State 
party.”236 This could involve considering matters such as the human 
rights record of the State to which a person is to be transferred. The 
Torture Committee has consistently maintained that the mere possibil-
ity of a person being subjected to torture in their home State does not 
suffice to prohibit his or her return owing to incompatibility with the 
non-refoulement provisions of CAT.237 The Committee has also con-
tended that the existence of a State’s consistent pattern of gross, fla-
grant, or mass violations of human rights does not constitute sufficient 
grounds for determining that a person would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture upon return to that State; additional grounds must 
exist that indicate that the individual concerned would be personally at 
risk.238 Conversely, the absence of a consistent pattern of gross viola-
tions of human rights does not mean that a person cannot be consid-
ered to be in danger of being subjected to torture in his or her specific 
                                                                                                                      
233 CAT, supra note 12, art. 3 (emphasis added). 
234 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council (ECOSOC), Comm. on Hum. Rts., Draft International 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1285 ( Jan. 23, 1978). 
235 Id. art. 4 (emphasis added). 
236 CAT General Comment, supra note 157, ¶ 5. 
237 Paez, CAT/C/18/D/39/1996, ¶ 6.4; Mutombo, CAT/C/12/D/13/1993, ¶ 6.3. 
238 Khan, CAT/C/32/D/15/1994, ¶ 12.2. See generally Y.H.A, CAT/C/27/D/162/2000, 
¶ 7.2. 
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circumstances.239 Therefore, it is crucial for a person to adduce addi-
tional evidence that will sufficiently demonstrate that the risk he or she 
claims to face is real, personal, and foreseeable. 
 In Mutombo, for example, the claimant’s profile was a key consid-
eration in the assessment of his application.240 Factors that were noted 
included his ethnic background, alleged political affiliation, detention 
history, desertion from the army, and clandestine departure from the 
DRC.241 Also considered were the gross human rights violations in 
which his home State was allegedly involved.242 Reports from U.N. 
agencies like the Commission of Human Rights, the Special Rappor-
teur on the Question of Torture, and the Working Group on Enforced 
or Involuntary Disappearances were referred to in an effort to deter-
mine the prevailing human rights situation in the country.243 These 
sources illustrated a “consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass viola-
tions” of human rights that was unlikely to improve in the near future. 
244 After considering the evidence, including the fact that the DRC was 
not a party to CAT, the Torture Committee concluded that it was more 
likely than not that the applicant would suffer torture if returned to his 
home State.245 
 In Y.H.A and H.M.H.I, the Torture Committee rejected claims by 
Somali nationals because State authority had been re-established in 
Somalia in the form of the TNG.246 These decisions raise serious con-
cerns. The first concern lies in the Committee’s acknowledgement that 
there were still widespread violations of human rights in the country. In 
Y.H.A., the Torture Committee recognized the “ongoing widespread 
violations of human rights in Somalia.”247 In H.M.H.I., the Committee 
noted “the existence in the [country] of a consistent pattern of gross, 
flagrant or mass violations of human rights.”248 Granted, the Torture 
Committee has persistently maintained that the existence of human 
rights violations is per se insufficient to prove a claim. This brings us to 
the second concern, which relates to the doubts that the Torture 
Committee itself raised in H.M.H.I regarding the reach of the TNG’s 
                                                                                                                      
239 Y.H.A, CAT/C/27/D/162/2000, ¶ 7.2; Khan, CAT/C/32/D/15/1994, ¶ 12.2. 
240 Mutombo, CAT/C/12/D/13/1993, ¶ 9.4. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. ¶¶ 9.3, 9.5. 
243 Id. ¶ 9.5. 
244 Khan, CAT/C/32/D/15/1994, ¶ 9.5. 
245 Mutombo, CAT/C/12/D/13/1993, ¶¶ 9.6–10. 
246 See infra notes 226–29 and accompanying text. 
247 Y.H.A., CAT/C/27/D/162/2000, ¶ 7.4. 
248 H.M.H.I., CAT/C/28/D/177/2001, ¶ 6.5. 
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territorial authority and its permanence. Considering the seemingly 
changed political circumstances, it is possible to distinguish Y.H.A and 
H.M.H.I from Elmi. Even so, it is still doubtful whether the applicants 
would have received effective protection if they were returned to their 
home State. It was averred in H.M.H.I that the applicant ought to have 
adduced “additional grounds” to show that he was “personally at 
risk.”249 However, the nature or content of the additional evidence re-
quired to prove a claim in such instances remains unclear. In fact, the 
Committee has so far failed to shed any light on this issue. Indeed, the 
practice of giving sufficient reasons for a decision promotes one of the 
fundamental requirements of due process, namely, the right to be 
heard (expressed in the maxim audi alteram partem). 250 This approach 
is likely to benefit claimants and States alike, as well as the general hu-
man rights and refugee regimes. 
 As is the case with applications seeking relief under CAT, the bur-
den of proof lies with the asylum seeker to demonstrate that he or she 
meets the definition of a refugee.251 In contrast to the CAT relief re-
gime, the threshold test of the Refugee Convention is ostensibly lower, 
and only requires proof on a balance of probability. According to the 
UNHCR, claimants only need to establish their claims to a “reasonable 
degree.”252 
B. Perpetrator of Act Causing Flight 
 States are generally liable for acts of public administrators. In 
contrast, their duty in relation to acts committed by non-State officials 
is limited. States can only be held accountable when they fail to “exer-
cise due diligence to prevent . . . injurious acts” committed by private 
actors. 253 This brings us to the second limitation. Article 3 of CAT re-
stricts application of the treaty to situations where a person is likely to 
face torture occasioned by public officials or any other person acting 
in the same capacity.254 This restriction is buttressed by Article 16 of 
                                                                                                                      
249 Id. ¶ 6.5. 
250 ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 14; UDHR, supra note 13, art. 10. 
251 UNHCR Handbook, supra note 175, ¶ 196 (providing that the burden of proof “lies 
on the person submitting a claim”); see also Aliens Act, No. 301 § 97(4) (2004) (Fin.) (enti-
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252 UNHCR Handbook, supra note 175, ¶ 42. 
253 Jennings & Watts, supra note 74, at 549. 
254 CAT, supra note 12, art. 3. 
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CAT, which requires States to “undertake measures to prevent” tor-
ture by public officials “or any other person acting in a personal ca-
pacity.”255 Consequently, a person can be handed over to a State 
where there are high chances that they could face severe physical or 
mental suffering caused by private individuals or groups, unless it can 
be shown that the State was unwilling to control them. 
 There are several instances where the Torture Committee has re-
jected applications lodged by failed asylum applicants because private 
actors committed the alleged acts. Examples include S.V.,256 Luis Chor-
lango v. Sweden,257 and G.R.B.258 Chorlango, an Ecuadorian national, 
and S, a Tamil from the area of Jaffna in north Sri Lanka, sought asy-
lum in Sweden and Canada respectively. Both alleged that they were at 
risk of torture at the hands of guerrilla groups, namely, Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias del Ecuador-Defensores del Pueblo (FARE-DP) (Chorlango) 
and LTTE (S.V.).259 S further claimed that his refusal to join LTTE 
made him a target of the movement.260 Similarly, in G.R.B., G, a Peru-
vian national whose application for asylum was rejected by the Swedish 
authorities, claimed that members of Sendero Luminoso had raped and 
imprisoned her for several nights before she managed to escape.261 
Both G and Chorlango claimed that they had lodged complaints with 
the local police, but that no action was taken.262 Sweden, the State Party 
involved in GRB and Chorlango, disputed these allegations. In Chorlango, 
it argued that “Ecuadorian authorities do not tolerate the activities of 
FARE-DP and that such activities were viewed as “criminal.”263  Stock-
holm also asserted that the claimant had failed to prove that Ecuador-
ian authorities were unable to protect him against FARE-DP.264 Canada 
espoused a similar line of argument in S.V. It was contended that Co-
lombo, the capital of Sri Lanka, had taken “different measures. . .to in-
vestigate and prevent acts of torture.”265 For example, “all arrests and 
detentions [had to] be reported to the Human Rights Commission (es-
                                                                                                                      
255 Id. art. 16. 
256 S.V., CAT/C/26/D/49/1996, ¶ 9.8. 
257 Chorlango v. Sweden, Comm. No. 218/2002, Comm. Against Torture, 33d Sess., ¶ 5.2, 
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/33/D/218/2002 (Nov. 23, 2004). 
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260 S.V., CAT/C/26/D/49/1996, ¶ 2.4. 
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262 Id. ¶ 4.3. 
263 Chorlango, CAT/C/33/D/218/2002, ¶ 4.6. 
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tablished in 1997) within 48 hours, . . . and a 24-hour service to deal 
with public complaints of instances of harassment by elements in the 
security forces ha[d] been established by the [Sri Lankan] Govern-
ment.”266 
 The Torture Committee found in favor of the State Parties in all 
three instances. It noted that the national authorities did not condone 
or tolerate activities by terrorist or guerrilla groups.267 Hence, acts by 
these non-governmental entities fell “outside the scope of article 3”268 
of CAT, unless such entities, as was the case in Elmi, exercised non-
governmental authority over the territory to which the complainant 
would be returned.269 This narrow construction, according to some 
scholars, is the “most significant limitation”270 of CAT, especially con-
sidering the myriad acts of torture that non-State entities, like insurgent 
groups, commit. Accordingly, this restriction renders the scope of CAT 
narrower than refugee law, which recognizes that persecution can 
emanate from both the State and non-State entities. Paragraph 65 of 
the UNHCR Handbook,271 entitled “agents of persecution,” provides: 
Persecution is normally related to action by the authorities of 
a country. It may also emanate from sections of the popula-
tion that do not respect the standards established by the laws 
of the country concerned. . . . Where serious discriminatory 
or other offensive acts are committed by the local populace, 
they can be considered as persecution if they are knowingly 
tolerated by the authorities, or if the authorities refuse, or 
prove unable, to offer effective protection.272 
                                                                                                                      
266 Id. 
267 See, e.g., Chorlango, CAT/C/33/D/218/2002, ¶ 5.2 (where it was noted that the 
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272 See also R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Adan, R v. Secre-
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C. Application Process 
 Thirdly, although the system of individual petitions is designed to 
operate as an instrument of enforcement by which victims of torture can 
seek international protection against their defaulting Governments, the 
Torture Committee is empowered to entertain petitions only when a 
State recognizes its jurisdiction. Drawing on the language of earlier in-
ternational human rights treaties, especially the 1976 ICCPR,273 Article 
22(1) of CAT states: 
A State Party . . . may at any time declare . . . that it recognizes 
the competence of the [Torture] Committee to receive and 
consider communications from or on behalf of individuals 
subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation 
by a State Party of the provisions of the [Convention]. No 
communication shall be received by the Committee if it con-
cerns a State Party to the [Convention] which has not made 
such a declaration.274 
As of January 1, 2006, fifty-four States had accepted the competence of 
the Torture Committee under Article 22 of CAT.275 Thus, individual 
petitions can only be received and heard by the Torture Committee 
against these States. Conversely, the Torture Committee can neither 
receive nor hear individual petitions against the remaining 138 States 
(seventy-two percent) that have not recognized its mandate. 
 This optional procedure allows State Parties to withdraw a declara-
tion “at any time”276 without prejudicing matters that are already in the 
adjudication process.277 John Kidd writes that the weakness of CAT in 
                                                                                                                      
273 According to Article 41(1) of the ICCPR: 
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274 CAT, supra note 12, art. 22(1). 
275 U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, In-
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this regard is “hardly surprising.”278 He contends that the weak en-
forcement provisions are “a reflection of jealously guarded national 
sovereignty and a consequent reluctance, at a general international 
level, to permit international legal intervention in matters considered 
to be within a State’s domestic jurisdiction.”279 
 This creates yet another fundamental weakness in CAT because 
States can ignore the mandate of the Torture Committee, the focal 
point of the CAT operational mandate. For example, following the 
decision in Elmi, the Australian Federal Government in its 2000 report 
to the Torture Committee expressed concern “about increasing re-
sort” to CAT by unsuccessful asylum-seekers, “apparently in an effort 
to delay their removal” from the country. 280 Further, it argued that “in 
nearly all cases such people have had their claims under the Refugee 
Convention, [CAT] and [ICCPR] exhaustively considered by domestic 
processes, and had utilized multiple layers of review.”281 It concluded 
that in the future, “it will closely examine each request from interim 
measure rather than automatically complying” with them.282  In many 
ways Australia’s reaction to Elmi affirms Lippman’s thesis that “a stark 
contradiction . . . continues to exist between the recognition that 
freedom from torture is a fundamental human right and the interna-
tional community’s deference to state sovereignty.”283 While compar-
ing fundamental rights such as the right to life or prohibition against 
slavery, Sharvit describes the prohibition against torture as one of the 
“most fundamental rights.”284 The fundamental point that Australia 
missed in Elmi is that the protection against torture is a fundamental 
human right that all democratic States should combat, not encourage. 
 Peder Magee describes this limitation as a “severe blow to [CAT] 
ability to function.”285 Arriving at the decision to withdraw a declaration 
could be influenced by several factors, including how a State interprets 
any decision of the Torture Committee. This is crucial, especially con-
sidering that a vast majority of its verdicts have centered on prohibiting 
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States from refouling asylum seekers facing deportation owing to failed 
refugee claims. Moreover, provisions such as Article 22 would be an in-
centive to those State Parties that have  poor human rights records to 
invoke and thereby remove themselves from CAT international scru-
tiny.286 Alternatively, some States may hesitate to become party to CAT 
or specific provisions, such as Article 22, thereby circumventing the in-
tended effect of the treaty. 
 In addition to the requirement that petitions can only be enter-
tained against those States that have agreed to be subject to the juris-
diction of the Torture Committee, individual claimants are required 
under the terms of the well-known international rule to exhaust all 
available domestic remedies before an application can be declared 
admissible.287 Notably, availability connotes accessibility. Thus, in prac-
tice, claimants must proceed to the highest or last decision maker in 
the hierarchy of courts and tribunals from which they would have ob-
tained an effective remedy. As Figure 2 shows, multiple procedures 
guide the refugee review process. 
 Generally, a refugee status determination official first hears asylum 
applications and decides whether the claimant is a person who meets 
the definition of refugee in the Refugee Convention.288 An asylum 
seeker must demonstrate that he or she fled their home State owing to 
“a well-founded fear” of persecution in their home State based on 
“race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion.”289 It is reasonable to assume that in objective legal 
systems decisions will be based on the facts that are presented and ar-
guments that the parties advance. If it is established that an individual 
faces persecution for one of the Refugee Convention reasons, the next 
line of inquiry involves determining if he or she is a genuine asylum 
seeker or a “bad” refugee that ought to be excluded. Those applicants 
who meet the refugee definition, and are able to show that there is no 
reason to exclude them from protection, are granted refugee status.290 
On the other hand, those claims that fail to meet these criteria are re-
jected.291 
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 Rejected applicants can appeal their cases to the requisite appel-
late court or tribunal.292 The first appellate decision-maker can either 
affirm or set aside the primary decision.293 If the latter option is exer-
cised, the matter is returned to the official who heard the initial appli-
cation for reconsideration in accordance with the terms outlined by the 
appellate court or tribunal.294 Dissatisfied parties can lodge further ap-
peals (usually before courts).295 Like the first appellate body, its second 
counterpart may affirm or set aside the primary decision. Rejected asy-
lum seekers at this stage become liable to deportation.296 Their success-
ful counterparts are returned to the original decision maker.297 Al-
though a court is the final arbiter in the judicial hierarchy, rejected 
claimants in some States have a last chance to plead their case after ex-
hausting the judicial machinery. For example, in Australia298 and Can-
ada,299 failed refugee claimants can appeal their cases to the Immigra-
tion Minister on compassionate and humanitarian grounds. In 
situations where discretionary remedies for failed applicants exist, 
these, too, must be invoked because they are also an effective form of 
domestic relief. 
 The exhaustion of all available domestic remedies rule reiterates 
provisions of international human rights law. For example, like CAT, 
the ICCPR states: 
The [Human Rights] Committee shall deal with a matter re-
ferred to it only after it has ascertained that all available do-
mestic remedies have been invoked and exhausted in the mat-
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298 Section 417 of the Migration Act 1958 empowers the Immigration Minister on 
grounds of “public interest” to “substitute for a decision” of the Refugee Review Tribunal 
“another decision, being a decision that is more favourable to the applicant.” Migration 
Act, 1958, § 417 (Austl.). Also, section 501J states that “[i]f the Minister thinks that it is in 
the public interest to do so, the Minister may set aside an [Administrative Appeals Tribu-
nal] protection visa decision and substitute another decision that is more favourable to the 
applicant in the review.” Id. 
299 Section 25(1) of the 2001 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act allows the Ca-
nadian Immigration Minister, on application or on his or her own volition, to grant an 
asylum seeker “permanent resident status or an exemption from any applicable criteria or 
obligation of [the] Act if the Minister is of the opinion that it is justified by humanitarian 
and compassionate considerations relating to them, taking into account the best interests 
of a child directly affected, or by public policy considerations.” Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act, S.C. 2001, ch. 27, § 25(1) (2001). 
320 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 30:277 
ter, in conformity with the generally recognized principles of 
international law.300 
Similarly, Article 11(3) of the 1966 International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICEFRD)301 is clear 
that applications will be entertained once “all available domestic reme-
dies have been invoked and exhausted.”302 The remedies to be ex-
hausted are those established by municipal law. 
 In terms of scope, the remedies to be exhausted under CAT are 
those established by municipal law as well. Two exceptions to the rule 
exist. First, in instances where the application for domestic remedies is 
unreasonably lengthy, Article 22(5)(2) of CAT creates an exception.303 
Like the ICCPR and the ICEFRD, it states that the rule of local reme-
dies, as it is sometimes referred to as, is inapplicable “where the appli-
cation of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged.”304 Thus, the rule of 
local remedies is inapplicable to situations where a person is unable to 
receive quick and efficient adjudication. Claimants bear the burden of 
showing that they are unable to receive quick and efficient adjudica-
tion. This exception recognizes the natural law maxim that justice de-
layed is justice denied. The test seems to be one of time, rather than 
one of access to “procedural facilities.”305 In light of the universal and 
unique nature of claims that come before the Torture Committee, few 
would deny that it is unattainable to lay a common standard regarding 
undue delay in the administration of justice. Hence, again, each case 
will have to be determined on its own merits. 
 The exhaustion of local remedies also requires a person to have 
recourse to the available substantive remedies for the object sought. 
Accordingly, and in contrast to ICEFRD and ICCPR, the local remedies 
rule under CAT is inapplicable in situations where it seems unlikely 
that invoking the domestic legal framework will bring any effective re-
lief to a claimant.306 In Bouabdallah Ltaief v. Tunisia,307 the Torture 
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Committee admitted Ltaief’s application, even though he had not ex-
hausted all local remedies, because it was apparent that domestic 
remedies were unavailable or an obviously futile means of recourse. 
Citing the Tunisian Statute of Limitations, the Torture Committee pri-
marily considered that the alleged acts of torture or cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment were barred by statute. Further, and more impor-
tantly, it was noted that, although the claimant had long before lodged 
complaints with the local authorities, there was hardly any evidence to 
suggest that the State had taken any “voluntary” investigations in rela-
tion to the allegations contained in the complaint. 308 Accordingly, the 
Torture Committee concluded that it was “very unlikely” in these cir-
cumstances that Ltaief “would obtain” any relief by exhausting local 
remedies.309 
 In contrast, the Refugee Convention does not contain similar pro-
visions, and the chances of facing problems of this nature are alto-
gether removed. Moreover, it is now generally accepted that the norm 
of refoulement has attained the status of customary international law310— 
that is, law that has evolved from the practice and customs of States.311 
Thus, all States, irrespective of whether they are party to the interna-
tional refugee treaty, are required to refrain from returning persons to 
places where their lives are at risk. 
D. Enforcement Mechanisms 
 The last limitation relates to CAT enforcement mechanism, which 
is greatly limited and restrictive in comparison to the Refugee Conven-
tion. Aside from the temporary protection that could be offered to 
refugees and asylum seekers via its non-refoulement provisions, there is 
little that the Torture Committee can do upon finding torture since it is 
a monitoring body with declaratory powers only. In Aemei, the Torture 
Committee made clear that “finding of a violation under article 3 has 
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declaratory character.”312 Thus, States are not “required to modify [their] 
decision(s) concerning the granting of asylum.”313 
 Additionally, where a person fails to demonstrate that he or she is 
likely to suffer torture if repatriated to his or her home State, the Tor-
ture Committee only goes as far as stating that the applicant has failed 
to prove “torture” and that their removal will not constitute a breach 
of Articles 3 or 16. It leaves the next line of action to the State in-
volved without making further recommendations for removal. 
 This gap in the law has created room for some refugee-receiving 
States to make a wide range of proposals regarding return of failed asy-
lum claimants. In H.M.H.I., for example, Australia made a curious rec-
ommendation. They offered to return the applicant, a failed asylum 
seeker from Somalia, to Kenya from where he was expected to find his 
way “to a stable area” of his “choice” in Somalia using the UNHCR vol-
untarily repatriation program.314 It is unclear from the evidence 
whether the Australian Government had sought and, indeed, received 
permission from Nairobi allowing the applicant entry into Kenya. Aside 
from noting the undesirability of removing the applicant to another 
State and expecting him to repatriate to his home State, there is very 
little that the Torture Committee can do to ensure that a failed appli-
cant is actually returned to a safe place in the relevant home State. 
 On the other hand, unlike the protection provided by CAT, inter-
national refugee law offers permanent or durable solutions, such as 
resettlement in third States and local integration, in addition to the 
non-refoulement prohibition. Figures 1 and 2 below are representations 
of enforcement mechanisms under CAT and the Refugee Convention 
respectively. 
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E. CAT and Refugee Convention Compared and Contrasted 
 Table 2 below compares and contrasts the nature of protection 
under CAT and the Refugee Convention. 
 
Table 2: Nature of Protection Under CAT and Refugee Convention 
 CAT Refugee Treaty 
 Scope of protection Targets persons generally 
(includes refugees and asylum 
seekers). 
Persons must be formally 
determined to be “refugee.” 
 Excluded persons None. “Bad” refugees. 
 Refoulement provision Absolute, non-derogable. Derogable on grounds of national security. 
 Relief No nexus requirement. Nexus― “for reasons of” ―requirement. 
 Time to assess claims Generally shorter. Longer. 
 Evidentiary threshold “Substantial” grounds. Balance of probability. 
 Perpetrator State actors. State and non-State actors. 
 Application process State must recognise 
competence of Torture 
Committee before individual 
petitions are filed. 
Claims directly lodged with 
third States. 
 Enforcement Mechanisms Limited to opinions. Durable solutions. 
 
Conclusion: Looking to the Future 
 The preceding analysis demonstrates that the protection regime of 
CAT is wider than that of the Refugee Convention regarding issues re-
lating to scope of protection, excluded persons, relief, and the refoule-
ment provision, as well the time taken to consider applications. The in-
ternational torture regime, however, is narrower than its asylum 
counterpart in relation to the evidentiary threshold, questions sur-
rounding perpetrators of acts alleged to constitute torture, the applica-
tion process, and enforcement mechanisms. Drawing on the advan-
tages of CAT over the Refugee Convention, it is arguable that in many 
respects, CAT provides complementary protection to asylum seekers 
displaced by torture. 
 This is not to infer that CAT should replace the Refugee Conven-
tion. Rather, in order to protect effectively victims of torture who have 
been forced to seek sanctuary elsewhere, the two instruments should 
reinforce one another. CAT should be seen as an effective tool rather 
than a hindrance. Practice shows that this wider approach has been 
embraced in some States. For example, the Canadian Supreme Court 
has argued that “underlying the [Refugee] Convention is the interna-
tional community’s commitment to the assurance of basic human rights 
326 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 30:277 
without discrimination.”315 Accordingly, if a humanitarian approach to 
the plight facing those seeking asylum as refugees is favored, it is ap-
parent that receiving States must adopt measures that seek to reinforce, 
rather than dilute, the already struggling asylum regime. 
 The idea of having a Torture Committee to monitor the eradica-
tion of torture globally is a sound one. However, its mandate and op-
eration, and hence CAT, is significantly hampered by the requirement 
that communications relating to the violation of the treaty can only be 
considered against States that have recognized the Committee’s juris-
diction. Recently, in December 2002, the international community 
adopted an Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Op-
tional Protocol)316 to reinforce the Torture Committee’s operational 
mandate. In particular, the Optional Protocol established a Sub-
Committee on Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment317 to carry out regular visits to 
places where people are deprived of their liberty, such as prisons, and 
to explore preventive measures at a domestic level.318 If the number of 
States that have signed or become party to this treaty is something to 
rely on, it shows a commitment by members of the international com-
munity to combat torture and other inhuman treatment. 319 This is an 
essential step toward fortifying the international human rights and 
refugee regimes. Notably, regional human rights treaties320 and inter-
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national humanitarian law321 recognize the prohibition against torture 
and inhuman treatment. 
  A State’s subscription to the wide range of international instru-
ments does not guarantee protection to those in need. The future of 
CAT depends on States taking practical steps to translate the provisions 
of international law into real rights. Meeting international obligations 
requires States to undertake good faith measures that will guarantee 
the enjoyment of rights to citizens and strangers alike. The negative 
duty of States in relation to torture means that they should refrain from 
engaging in acts that could constitute torture and or cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment. Thus, the diplomatic assurances that the 
United Kingdom and the United States are said to have entered into 
with Lebanon,322 as well as with Egypt323 and Syria,324 to allow for the 
return of persons suspected of terrorist activities is a step in the wrong 
direction in the global fight against torture. 
 Granted, Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus are said to have promised 
that returnees will be protected from torture or cruel, inhuman, or de-
grading treatment. Nevertheless, these agreements raise serious con-
cerns. Primarily, the ability of London or Washington to effectively 
monitor or enforce these assurances remains questionable. Addition-
ally, because these States are known to systematically practice torture,325 
it is doubtful whether these agreements can provide returnees with an 
adequate guarantee of safety. Curiously, in its 2005 report, the U.S. De-
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partment of State described the human rights record of both Egypt and 
Lebanon as awful.326 As the Torture Committee327 and regional courts 
like the European Court of Human Rights328 have stressed, procure-
ment of a diplomatic assurance with a government that has a well-
documented record of torture offers very little protection against fu-
ture violations. The historical record affirms this position.329 Further, it 
is arguable that these agreements sanction the use of torture or inhu-
man treatment. Moreover, entering into such agreements is inconsis-
tent with President George W. Bush’s claim that it is the policy of his 
Administration to “neither torture suspects nor deliver them to coun-
tries where they are likely to be tortured,”330 and Prime Minister Tony 
Blair’s statement that the United Kingdom “utterly condemn[s] torture 
in every set of circumstances.”331 In sum, policies such as these are 
likely to severely compromise the system of protection of those fearing 
torture at home.332 
 Few would deny that CAT and its Optional Protocol cannot totally 
eradicate torture. Even so, they can add necessary impetus to an ongo-
ing fight. We find ourselves in a world in which the self-proclaimed 
champions of human rights and democracy, like Australia, the United 
States, and the United Kingdom, have been implicated in acts of tor-
ture or inhuman treatment in the wake of the “war on terrorism.”333 
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Thus the battle against torture must continue to be waged full force, 
lest the so-called “rogue States” follow the “great protectors” into a law-
less abyss. 
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